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Constitutional Court Landscape Post-Arab Spring: A Survey of Design
DANE KIRCHOFF-FOSTER*
INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2010, in Tunisia, a young man named Mohammed Bouazizi set himself
on fire in protest of government corruption. This action eventually sparked a nationwide protest
movement that became known in Tunisia as the “Jasmine Revolution.”1 The revolution proved to
be the beginning of a massive popular democratic movement throughout the region of the Middle
East and North Africa (hereafter MENA), now known as the “Arab Spring.” Major protests in
various countries eventually led to the collapse of some Arab regimes, and it prompted a process
of constitutional reform in others.2 One reform displayed by many countries in the region has been
the formation or strengthening of constitutional courts that exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
constitutional judicial review.3 The broad question this article seeks to answer is this: How did the
Arab Spring change the MENA region’s constitutional court landscape? The article also broaches
the narrower question of whether, where, and how the Arab Spring challenged authoritarianism in
the region.
This is a case study seeking to survey the landscape of constitutional courts in the MENA
region after the Arab Spring. To accomplish this, the case study identifies the traditional functions
of constitutional courts, then analyzes the design features present in post-Arab Spring
constitutional courts to determine how and to what extent these design features help – or hinder –

* J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, Indiana University
Bloomington.
1 Elie Abouaoun, Tunisia Timeline: Since the Jasmine Revolution, United States Institute of Peace (July 12,
2019), https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/tunisia-timeline-jasmine-revolution.
2 Primoz Manfreda, 8 Countries That Had Arab Spring Uprisings, ThoughtCo. (July 3, 2019),
https://www.thoughtco.com/arab-spring-uprisings-2353039.
3 Sujit Choudhry and Katherine Glenn Bass, Constitutional Courts After the Arab Spring: Appointment
mechanisms and relative judicial independence 9 (Center for Constitutional Transitions and International IDEA
ed. 2014).

each court in fulfilling its traditional functions. Analysis of design features will focus on (1) which
(and how many) constitutional matters the court is empowered to decide (court jurisdiction), (2)
the processes by which a court is presented a matter upon which it is empowered to decide (court
access), and (3) the process by which judges are appointed to the court (court appointment).
This article proceeds in four sections. Section I is dedicated to this paper’s limitations,
presented at the beginning to help frame this case study’s goals and scope. In Section II, a short
and relevant history is presented summarizing the Arab Spring experiences of the following five
subject countries: Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Kuwait. The selection of these countries
– and the exclusion of other countries – are justified in Section I.
In Section III, six traditional functions of constitutional courts particularly relevant to the
MENA region context are identified, explained, and applied to the constitutional court landscape.
These six functions are: post-authoritarian legal reform, protection of individual rights, separation
of powers, review of elections and electoral laws, political party regulation, and oversight of
constitutional amendment procedures. Discussion of each of these six functions is followed by
analysis of the court design features of each of the five constitutional courts in light of how and to
what extent these courts seem equipped to fulfill each traditional function.
In Section IV, the landscape of constitutional courts is surveyed broadly by comparing each
court’s unique design. The relative strengths and weaknesses of each constitutional court are
judged by how well the design appears to equip the court to fulfill its traditional functions
previously identified.
I.

LIMITATIONS

This case study contains a few limitations. Firstly, this case study includes the five
countries in the MENA region most ripe for analysis, but not necessarily all countries analyzable.
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Syria, for example, although it has had a Supreme Constitutional Court since the passage of its
2012 Constitution, has also experienced continuous civil conflict since 2011. Similarly, in Libya,
although the Constitutional Chamber of its Supreme Court continued to function through the
collapse of the Qaddaffi regime, civil conflict continues today in the absence of any universally
accepted government. Ongoing political upheaval in these countries naturally disrupts any
constitutional reform or court activity such that the effect of court design features on the
accomplishment of traditional constitutional court functions is difficult or impossible to ascertain.4
Significantly, this case study also excludes from its analysis Egypt’s much-studied Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) because this study counts President al-Sisi’s sustained efforts of
judicial capture against the SCC as a similarly obscuring variable.5
Secondly, lack of access to original legislative documents has rendered this article at times
dependent on secondhand analysis from other sources. Lastly, there has been a conspicuous lack
of journalistic reporting and academic research into the development of constitutional courts in the
MENA region since at least 2014. Recent developments in court design may have been missed
simply because no one has been reporting them.

To illustrate this point: Tunisia has failed to appoint almost any members to its Constitutional Court, which
is fairly attributable to faults in the Court’s design features (all discussed infra). Ongoing civil conflict,
however, is an obscuring variable such that a similar failure of appointment in Syria or Libya would be harder
to attribute.
5 Since the rise of President al-Sisi in July of 2013, the SCC has been made subject to increasing executive
control, accomplished in part by changes to its design. This process of judicial capture has been just one
aspect of the President’s successful efforts to centralize power and silence opposition to his authoritarian
government. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Constitutional Amendments Entrench Repression (Apr. 20,
2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/20/egypt-constitutional-amendments-entrench-repression#;
Merrit Kennedy, Egypt Approves Constitutional Changes That Could Keep Sissi In Office Until 2030, National
Public Radio (Apr. 23, 2019). The goal of this study is to Reforms to the SCC post-Arab Spring have
transparently been made in opposition to a liberal constitutional framework, rather than in furtherance of
one. It is therefore unhelpful to ask whether
4
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II.

MENA REGION COURTS AND THE ARAB SPRING

This section briefly recounts the Arab Spring experiences of each of the five subject
countries: Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Kuwait. This section highlights any events of
the Arab Spring that precipitated a constitutional response or exercise of constitutional judicial
review.
A. The Arab Spring in Tunisia
Scholars often call Tunisia “the birthplace of the Arab Spring.”6 It is here that the protest
movement began, with the self-immolation of local vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in December of
2010, an act committed in response to harassment by local police in Tunisia’s authoritarian
regime.7 One month later, after Tunisia’s armed forces refused the Tunisian president’s orders to
crack down on the protests,8 President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country with his family to
Saudi Arabia.9 In October of 2011, the first parliamentary elections were held, marking a
significant shift from authoritarianism to democracy.10 Tunisia is the only country in this case
study that has transitioned to an entirely new system of government.
The Tunisian Constitutional Court was established on January 27, 2014 with the adoption
of Tunisia’s new Constitution.11 This Constitutional Court was meant to replace the country’s
Constitutional Council, a body completely appointed by the President that heard cases only by

Manfreda, ThoughtCo.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Abouaoun, United States Institute of Peace. The President fled on January 14, 2011.
10 Manfreda, ThoughtCo.
11 Amel Arfaoui, The Constitutional Design of the Judiciary in Tunisia: Post-Arab Spring, IACL-AIDC Blog (July
15, 2019) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2019globrev/2019/7/15/the-constitutional-design-of-the-judiciary-intunisia-post-arab-spring.
6
7
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referral of the President.12 However, as of January 2021, Tunisia still lacks a functioning
Constitutional Court: only one member out of twelve has been appointed to the Court.13
B. The Arab Spring in Jordan
On January 14, 2011, as many as 15,000 protesters took to the streets of Jordan to
participated in the “Yawm Al-Ghadab” (“Day of Anger,” also translated as “Day of Rage”).14
However, protesters in Jordan were not united against the regime nor in calling for its abolition;
rather, the protesters called for the removal of the prime minister and his cabinet.15 Jordan’s King
Abdullah obliged.16 Protests continued, but several factors (including a lack of common theme, as
well as fear of the violence and chaos experienced by Syria and Egypt) contributed to a slowing
of the Arab Spring movement in Jordan.17
In further response to calls for reform, Jordan’s regime generated a new 2011 Constitution
that included provisions for the formation of a constitutional court.18 On June 6, 2012,
accompanying legislation for the Court in the form of Constitutional Court Law No. 5 of 2012
(5/2012) was enacted.19 King Abdullah appointed all nine members, including the president, to the
Court by royal decree.20

Choudhry & Bass, at 17.
Jihen Jouini, Tunisia Needs a Constitutional Court as Soon as Possible, Democracy Speaks (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/tunisia-needs-constitutional-court-soon-possible; Sinan Hanioglu,
Gridlock hamstrings Tunisian Constitutional Court, Foreign Brief (July 3, 2020),
https://foreignbrief.com/daily-news/gridlock-hamstrings-tunisian-constitutional-court/. Tunisia’s Assembly
of Representatives elected Rawda Al-Wersigni to the Constitutional Court in 2018.
14 Curtis R. Ryan, Five years after Arab uprisings, security trumps reforms in Jordan, The Washington Post (Mar.
4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/04/five-years-after-arabuprisings-security-trumps-reforms-in-jordan/.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Choudhry & Bass, at 17-18.
19 Jordan: Constitutional Law Court Newly Established in Jordan, Library of Congress (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/jordan-constitutional-law-court-newly-established-injordan/.
20 Id.
12
13
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C. The Arab Spring in Bahrain
Anti-government protests in Bahrain began on February 15, 2011.21 The opposing forces
in the protests reflected preexisting tensions within Bahrain between the majority Shiite population
and the Sunni royal family.22 Tens of thousands waged protests despite gunfire from security
forces.23 The situation eventually required the intervention of neighboring countries (led by Saudi
Arabia) to keep Bahrain’s royal family in power.24
Despite the intervention, the protests still triggered within the Bahraini government a
cascade of constitutional reform, including a royal decree reforming the Constitutional Court.25
Bahrain’s Constitutional Court was originally established in 2002 by Decree-Law No. 27 of 2002
(Decree-Law 27-2002); the King of Bahrain’s subsequent royal decree known as Decree-Law No.
38 of 2012 (Decree-Law 38-2012) changed the positions on the Court, adjusted the term of office
for Court members, and gave the Court more financial independence.26 Violent civil unrest and
government crackdowns, however, continued in Bahrain.27
D. The Arab Spring in Morocco
On February 20, 2011, thousands of protesters gathered all around Morocco to demand
constitutional reform and limits on the King’s power.28 In response, King Mohammed VI
announced a new draft Constitution in June of 2011 that included a provision to replace the existing
Constitutional Council with a Constitutional Court.29 In July, a national referendum on the

Manfreda, ThoughtCo.
Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Choudhry & Bass, at 17. The royal decree was issued August 15, 2012.
26 Bahrain: Royal Decree Amends Provisions on Constitutional Court, Library of Congress (Aug. 22, 2012),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/bahrain-royal-decree-amends-provisions-on-constitutionalcourt/.
27 Manfreda, ThoughtCo.
28 Manfreda, ThoughtCo.
29 Choudhry & Bass, at 18.
21
22

6

proposed Constitution passed with apparently near-unanimous approval.30 On August 13, 2014,
legislation dictating the organization of the Court came into force.31 In January of 2018, Draft
Organic Law 86.15 was passed through the legislature; this law dictated the terms by which a
constitutional case in controversy may reach the Court.32
E. The Arab Spring in Kuwait
Kuwait has had a Constitutional Court since 1973. The Arab Spring did not ultimately
produce any reform in this Court, but the Court was often called upon to exercise its power of
constitutional review during this time. Its actions led many to see Kuwait’s Constitutional Court
as a tool for resisting political change and keeping power centralized in the authoritarian regime.
Arab Spring protests began in Kuwait in the summer of 2011 with calls for the resignation
of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed Al Sabah, the nephew of Kuwait’s Emir.33 The
peak of the tension occurred in November 2011 when the Constitutional Court blocked the
parliamentary questioning of the Prime Minister over a corruption scandal involving members of
Kuwait’s National Assembly.34 In response, about 100 protesters – including members of the
National Assembly – stormed and occupied the National Assembly building, calling for the Prime
Minister’s removal.35 The mounting civil unrest forced the Emir “to give in to street pressure”: the
Emir replaced the Prime Minister and dissolved the National Assembly by royal decree. 36 Fresh
elections were held in February of 2012, which “resulted in an opposition landslide.”37

Id. According to official results from the Moroccan government, the referendum passed with 98% approval
of the public.
31 Organic Law No. 066.13 (2014). Morocco: Remove Obstacles to Access to the Constitutional Court 3
(International Commission of Jurists ed. February 2018).
32 International Commission of Jurists, supra note 37 at 3.
33 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Kuwait: Political crisis at critical juncture, BBC News (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20026581.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
30
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However, on June 20, 2012, Kuwait’s Constitutional Court prevented this power shift by
dissolving the new Assembly and reinstating the previous, declaring the royal decree
unconstitutional with little explanation.38 This move by the Court was characterized by opposition
leaders as “a coup against the constitution.”39 On the other hand, on September 25, 2012, the Court
also rejected the Emir’s request to redraw electoral districts (many considered the redrawing to
unfairly advantage the existing authoritarian regime).40 This prompted the Emir in October to again
dissolve the Assembly41 and augment electoral law using emergency powers.42 The following
elections in December 2012 were widely boycotted.43 Despite the Court’s earlier opposition to the
Emir’s electoral redistricting plan, it did enforce the Emir’s new electoral law by dissolving the
Assembly on June 13, 2013.44

III.

FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

There are several theoretical functions and uses of constitutional courts in academic
literature.45 In any given political environment, certain constitutional court functions will
undoubtedly be more useful than others. In countries with long histories of entrenched
authoritarian rule, a few reforms are especially salient to the success of a liberal constitutional
framework: the authoritarian regime must be removed and replaced with the new constitutional

Id.
Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Reuters, Kuwait Court Dissolves Parliament and Calls Vote that Opposition May Boycott, The New York Times
(June 16, 2013), nytimes.com/2013/06/17/world/middleeast/kuwait-court-dissolves-parliament-and-callsvote-that-opposition-may-boycott.html.
43 Kuwait profile – Timeline, BBC (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14647211.
44 Reuters.
45 Choudhry & Bass, at 19-28. The authors list seven and then five theoretical functions and uses of
constitutional courts. I have taken the headings and substance of these lists and reduced them to six
“functions” of constitutional courts that seem particularly relevant to post-Arab Spring countries.
38
39
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framework; that constitutional framework must be enforced; and the political institutions must be
protected against recapture by authoritarian forces.
This article has identified six theoretical functions of a constitutional court that seem
particularly relevant in the post-Arab Spring context: (a) post-authoritarian legal reform; (b)
protection of individual rights; (c) separation of powers; (d) review of electoral law and elections;
(e) political party regulation; and (f) oversight of constitutional amendment procedures.
Constitutional court functions may find expression in several aspects of court design,
including a court’s jurisdiction, access to the court, and the court appointment process. However,
court functions are perhaps most broadly achieved through a court’s jurisdiction. For the purposes
of this research, a court’s jurisdiction over constitutional matters amounts to the sorts of
constitutional matters that the court is empowered to decide.
In this section, each of the six constitutional court functions will be expounded upon in its
own subsection. An explanatory paragraph for the court function will be followed by mention of
the relevant jurisdictional powers held by any of the five subject countries. If applicable, discussion
of jurisdiction will be followed by discussion of court access – the processes by which a court is
presented a matter upon which it is empowered to decide – and court appointment process – the
process by which judges are appointed to the constitutional court.
A. Post-Authoritarian Legal Reform
In political shifts away from authoritarianism, constitutional courts can play an important
practical and symbolic role in the restructuring of political society. Practically, constitutional
courts are well-positioned to measure existing laws (perhaps passed under more authoritarian
regimes) against the requirements of a new Constitution to determine which still “pass muster.”46

46

Choudhry & Bass, at 26.
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Symbolically, a constitutional court (either its formation or its significant reform) can represent a
“legal break” with past injustices and repression.47
1. Jurisdiction and Post-Authoritarian Legal Reform: Impeachment, States of
Emergency, Draft Laws
A few jurisdictional powers relevant to post-authoritarian legal reform are within the
explicit jurisdiction of only a couple of constitutional courts studied. Impeachment represents the
power to remove an executive for abuse of power or wrongful conduct, and therefore is a direct
protection against a return to authoritarianism in the executive. Similarly, power to review or end
states of emergency – constitutionally permitted power-shifts designed to temporarily grant broad
powers to the executive in times of crisis – helps guard against their arbitrary use. The power to
review draft laws as a check on authoritarianism is prospective rather than retrospective: a court
with this power can prevent legal regimes tending toward authoritarianism before they are enacted.
a. Impeachment: Tunisia
Tunisia’s Court acts as the final decision-maker in the condemnation of the President in an
impeachment process.48 The Court may decide to condemn the President only after a two-thirds
majority of the legislature has voted to refer the matter.49 If the Court condemns the President (also
by a two-thirds majority), it then orders the President removed from office.50 The Court’s power
over the impeachment process is obviously dependent upon prior legislative action, but it doubles
as a check on both executive authoritarianism and legislative abuse of impeachment. The power
of impeachment also has strong symbolic value.

Id.
Tunisia Constitution (2014), article 88.
49 Id.
50 Id.
47
48
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b. States of Emergency: Tunisia
Tunisia’s Court also has a role to play in ending states of emergency. Thirty days after the
President has declared a state of emergency, a group of at least thirty members of the legislature
(out of 217)51 may petition the Constitutional Court for a decision as to whether the exceptional
circumstances that warranted the state of emergency continue to exist.52 Thus, with some help from
the legislature, Tunisia’s Court can prevent arbitrary exercise of more authoritarian rule.
c. Draft Laws: Morocco
Jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of draft laws can also bring about postauthoritarian legal reform. Since this jurisdictional power is prospective rather than retrospective,
it allows courts to serve as a check on the “creep” of authoritarian tendencies back into the legal
framework before it ever happens. However, if a draft law must first be referred to the
constitutional court (and therefore not directly or automatically accessible by the court), the court’s
ability to contribute to post-authoritarian legal reform through this process is severely hampered.
The governmental actors from which a return to authoritarianism is feared are the very ones acting
as “gatekeepers” for the referral of these draft laws.
Out of the five constitutional courts studied, only Morocco’s Constitutional Court is
empowered to automatically review the constitutionality of draft laws—specifically, organic laws
and Chamber regulations.53 Bahrain’s Court may review draft laws only upon referral by the
King;54 Tunisia’s Court may review them only upon referral by the President, Head of

Alarabiya News, Tunisia begins landmark election race,
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/africa/2014/10/04/Tunisia-begins-landmark-election-race- (last visited
May 12, 2021).
52 Tunisia Const., art. 80.
53 Morocco Constitution (2011), articles 69, 85, 132.
54 Bahrain Constitution (2002), article 106.
51
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Government, or 30 members of Tunisia’s Assembly.55 Jordan’s and Kuwait’s constitutional
provisions and enacting legislation do not explicitly state that their constitutional courts have any
power to review draft laws.
2. Access and Post-Authoritarian Legal Reform: Narrow Jurisdiction, Restricted Access
Asking the question of jurisdiction naturally leads to the question of access: how are
constitutional courts presented the constitutional matters they are empowered to decide? This
question can be reframed as one of referral or “gatekeeping”: who holds the keys to the
constitutional court? The entity that controls access to the constitutional court also controls how
much power the court can practically wield.
The problem of access is not limited to the function of post-authoritarian legal reform. Each
constitutional matter within the jurisdiction of a particular court has a corresponding procedure of
access. However, while restricted access to a court naturally impedes the court’s ability to perform
each of its intended functions, it also has the distinct characteristic of preserving the status quo and
protecting the potentially repressive political tradition that constitutional courts are so often tasked
with disrupting. Every function of a constitutional court is itself a contribution to post-authoritarian
legal reform. Restricted court access, therefore, impedes this reform on many levels.
a. Narrow Jurisdiction
Court access is impeded when a court’s jurisdiction is narrow – when it has been
empowered to act on only a small number of matters. A constitutional court can never hear a matter
that it is not empowered to decide. An expansion of jurisdiction means an expansion of access to
the court, which means an increase in a court’s ability to operate within its traditional functions,
and therefore an increase in the potential for post-authoritarian legal reform.

55

Tunisia Const., art. 120.
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Out of the five constitutional courts studied, only Morocco’s56 and Kuwait’s57 have explicit
jurisdiction over elections and electoral laws and over political parties (discussed in more detail
infra). The constitutional courts of both Morocco58 and Tunisia59 have jurisdiction over several
matters, although Tunisia’s Court has no explicit power over election-related matters. Bahrain’s
jurisdiction is comparatively narrower.60 The jurisdictions of the Courts of Jordan61 and Kuwait62
are more vaguely worded, which potentially gives opportunity for greater judicial initiative on the
one hand, or greater external restriction on the other.
b. Restricted Access
When a constitutional court frequently depends upon referrals from other actors to consider
matters within its own jurisdiction, very few matters have “direct access” to the court. For any
given matter within the jurisdiction of the five constitutional courts studied, there is often at least
one decision-maker in between that matter and the court. This results in restricted access. In Jordan
and Bahrain, no constitutional matter whatsoever has direct access to their Constitutional Courts.

56

Morocco Const., art. 61; International Commission of Jurists at 3.
Law No. 14 of 1973 Establishing the Constitutional Court (Kuwait).
58
In addition to elections, electoral law, and political parties, Morocco’s court has jurisdiction over the
constitutionality of organic laws before their promulgation (Art. 85, 132), the constitutionality of legislative chamber
regulations (Art. 69, 132), constitutional amendment procedures (Art. 174), disputes over the constitutionality of
laws (Art. 79), draft laws and treaties upon referral (Art. 132, 55), and constitutional cases in controversy (Art. 133).
59
Tunisia’s Court has jurisdiction over the constitutionality of treaties and rules of procedure (and draft laws upon
referral) (Art. 120), constitutional cases in controversy (Art. 120), certain disputes over constitutional power (Art.
101), the constitutionality of constitutional amendments and amendment procedures (Art. 144, 120), impeachment
of the President (Art. 88), and ending states of emergency (Art. 80).
60
Bahrain’s Court has jurisdiction over disputes relating to the constitutionality of laws and regulations, as well as
the constitutionality of laws before their promulgation (upon referral) and constitutional cases in controversy.
Decree-Law No. 27 of 2002 (Establishing the Constitutional Court), 18 Sept. 2002 (Bahrain).
61
Jordan Constitution (1952), article 58, § 1 (The Court “shall have the competence of oversight on the
constitutionality of the applicable laws and regulations.”). Further, Jordan’s Constitutional Court has “the right to
interpret provisions of the Constitution” upon request by another political actor (Id. at § 2), which essentially puts
the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction into the hands of the referring actors.
62
Kuwait’s Law 14/1973 uses very general language to grant Kuwait’s Court power to interpret constitutional texts
and settle disputes over constitutionality of laws and decrees. Law 14/1973’s explicit grant of power to hear appeals
relating to the election and membership of National Assembly representatives does not bring much clarity to how far
the Kuwaiti Court’s jurisdiction reaches in practice.
57

13

By contrast, Tunisia’s constitution provides that new proposed constitutional amendments
and amendment procedures have direct access to the Court, since the Court must affirm their
constitutionality before they go into effect.63 Similarly, newly proposed amendment procedures
for Morocco’s constitution have direct access to Morocco’s Constitutional Court, since its Court
“controls the regularity of the [constitutional amendment procedure] and proclaims the results.”64
Moroccan organic laws and Chamber regulations also go directly to Morocco’s Constitutional
Court for review of their constitutionality before their promulgation.65 Kuwait’s constitutional
complaint system, instituted by Law No. 14 of 1973, creates uniquely direct access to Kuwait’s
Constitutional Court for anything considered a “constitutional complaint”66—this system will be
discussed at more length in the subsection infra on protection of individual rights.
B. Protection of Individual Rights
Constitutional courts in democratizing countries face a natural tension between
empowering majority rule and protecting individuals and minorities. In a world of majority rule,
“courts can provide a forum for individual citizens or minority groups to bring complaints
regarding government violations of their constitutionally protected rights.”67 The ability of such
courts to review cases in controversy, coupled with individual litigants’ access to the courts, helps
courts perform the function of protecting individual rights.
1. Jurisdiction and Protection of Individual Rights: Cases in Controversy, Constitutional
Complaints

63

Tunisia Const., art. 144, 120.
Morocco Const., art. 174.
65
Id. at art. 69, 85, 132.
66
Law No. 14 of 1973 (Establishing the Constitutional Court) (Kuwait). See also Hirotake Ishiguro, Utilitizing the
Judiciary to Reject the Popular Will?: Legal Mobilization after the Arab Uprising in Kuwait 7-8 (Institute of
Developing Economies ed. 2017).
67
Choudhry & Bass, at 21.
64
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Protection of individual rights is jurisdictionally implicated whenever a court is empowered
to decide constitutional disputes brought by or on behalf of individuals. For example, constitutional
cases in controversy often arise when an individual alleges encroachment by the government or a
third party on a constitutionally protected right, and a court’s power to decide such cases gives that
court power to grant such protection. Any jurisdictional power that allows individuals to be heard
by the court is a power that relates to this traditional court function. It also follows that a court’s
broader jurisdiction over matters relating to individuals simultaneously gives individuals greater
access to these courts, so for the protection of individual rights, these separate elements of court
design overlap.
a. Cases in Controversy
Cases in controversy typically reach constitutional courts upon referral from lower courts
that have determined that the particular case involves an essential question of constitutionality.
This is the basic system for the constitutional courts of Tunisia,68 Jordan,69 Morocco,70 Bahrain,71
and (less obviously) Kuwait.72

68

Tunisia Const., art. 120.
Law No. 15 of 2012 outlines the process of referral for cases in controversy, which includes referral by the Court
of Cassation. Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Order, Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and Islam after the Arab Spring
727-28 (Oxford University Press ed. 2016).
70
Morocco Const., art. 133. Morocco’s system of referral for cases in controversy also includes referral by the
Court of Cassation. Supra note 36 at 3.
71
Decree-Law No. 27 of 2002 (Establishing the Constitutional Court), 18 Sept. 2002, art. 9 (Bahrain). See also
Bahrain Const., art. 106 (“The law shall guarantee the right of the Government, Consultative Council, the Chamber
of Deputies and notable individuals and others to challenge before the Court the constitutionality of laws and
statutes.”)
72
Hirotake Ishiguro, Utilitizing the Judiciary to Reject the Popular Will?: Legal Mobilization after the Arab
Uprising in Kuwait 7-8 (Institute of Developing Economies ed. 2017).
69
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Two countries – Jordan73 and Morocco74 – require referral of constitutional cases in
controversy by not just the lower court of first instance, but also the Court of Cassation. A natural
impediment to constitutional court action can be expected when an individual asserting his rights
must pass through two gatekeepers instead of one. The Court of Cassation acting as gatekeeper is
especially problematic because, before the advent of constitutional courts in Jordan and Morocco
following the Arab Spring, the Courts of Cassation in these countries held jurisdiction over
constitutional matters. There is therefore substantial institutional disincentive for the Courts of
Cassation to voluntarily relinquish authority over constitutional cases in controversy to these
relatively new constitutional courts.
b. Constitutional Complaints: Kuwait
Kuwait’s Constitutional Court has the power to interpret constitutional texts, and to settle
disputes that relate to the constitutionality of laws and decrees.75 This power, granted by Law No.
14 of 1973, is put in very broad terms. One commentator has helpfully summarized the
implementation of the ambiguous language of Law 14/1973 of Kuwait:
There are three ways to submit a constitutional complaint. The first is through the National
Assembly (parliament) or the Council of Ministers (cabinet). The second way is through
an ordinary court when a trial needs a constitutional judgment. And third, an individual
citizen can submit a complaint, which is unique to Kuwait. In this case, a preliminary
review board consisting of three judges from the Constitutional Court screens the
constitutional complaint submitted by the individual. If it merits examination, it is referred
to the Constitutional Court. People submit cases regarding parliamentary elections, such as
qualification examinations of candidates and complaints against the result of elections.76

73

Pursuant to the Jordan’s Law of the Constitution Court, No. 15 of 2012 (15/2012), cases in controversy may only
reach the Jordan Court upon referral by a lower court to a Higher Court composed of three judges of the Court of
Cassation, which then has discretion to refer the case to the Court. Grote, supra note 72.
74
Morocco’s Organic Law 86.15 requires that lower courts first refer a case to the Cassation Court, which decides
whether to refer the case to the Constitutional Court. Supra note 36 at 3.
75
Law No. 14 of 1973 (Establishing the Constitutional Court) (Kuwait).
76
Ishiguro, at 7-8.
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Kuwait’s Constitutional Court, therefore, is designed with four points of access: referral by the
National Assembly; referral by the Council of Ministers; referral of a case by a lower court; and,
uniquely, citizens’ direct constitutional complaint referred by three of the five members of the
Constitutional Court. In comparison to traditional systems regarding cases in controversy,
Kuwait’s constitutional complaint system removes the barrier of the intermediary court and
potentially gives the Kuwaiti Court greater ability to protect individual rights.
C. Separation of Powers
Constitutional courts have the power to make final determinations on the roles and powers
of the separate dimensions or branches of government, in order to clear up ambiguity and prevent
the usurpation of powers by one political actor from another. Constitutional courts have the
authority to declare which powers are constitutionally granted to whom.77 It is centrally important
as well that constitutional courts themselves be safeguarded from usurpation by other political
actors—for that reason, the court appointment process is essential in determining a court’s capacity
to perform its function of ensuring separation of powers.
1. Jurisdiction and Separation of Powers: Defining Powers
All constitutional courts have jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation. However,
clarification and safeguarding of the powers and roles of competing political actors require a
mechanism by which to bring constitutional concerns before the court. A constitutional court’s
jurisdiction over cases in controversy involving constitutional matters can serve as that needed
mechanism—it just requires a litigant (a citizen, or sometimes a government actor) to make a
constitutional challenge to begin the adjudication process.
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17

Other than through cases in controversy, a few courts have other possible mechanisms for
defining the roles and powers of different political actors. Jordan’s Court is granted by
constitutional provision “the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution” upon request by
another political actor.”78 Kuwait’s Court has the general power to interpret constitutional texts,
granted by its enacting legislation.79 Tunisia’s constitution includes a much more specific
provision: if a dispute arises between the President of the Republic and the Head of Government
over the constitutional powers each entity wields, the Court is empowered to settle the dispute.80
2. Court Appointment and Separation of Powers: Executive Model, Multi-Constituency
Model, Judicial Council Model
Judicial independence is key to ensuring separation of powers. In turn, a constitutional
court’s appointment model (the procedure by which members of the court are initially appointed)
has a significant impact on the independence of its members. A well-designed model will prevent
any one political actor from dominating the appointment process or from using the process for
political gain. A poorly designed model risks at least two negative outcomes. First, a single
dominating political actor may use the appointment power to dictate court opinion, and therefore
dictate how the constitution is interpreted. Alternatively, an appointment model may require too
much political cooperation for the system to accommodate; the result is a stalling of the
appointment process such that the constitutional court cannot act as a safeguard against the
usurpation of power by and from other political actors.

78 Jordan Const. art. 59, § 2.
79 Law No. 14 of 1973 (Establishing the Constitutional Court), art. 1 (Kuwait).
80 Tunisia Const., art. 101.

18

For basic models of court appointment processes, several constitutional design options
exist.81 The appointment processes of the five constitutional courts that make up the subject of this
article fall into three of these models of design.
a. Executive Model: Jordan and Bahrain
The executive model is the most popular court appointment process in the MENA region.
In this model, the executive has significant control over the appointment process, with little or no
contribution from other political actors.82 Executive models for constitutional court appointments
generally receive harsh criticism:
A constitutional court whose judges are selected solely by the executive, without
the participation of any other political or civil society actors, stands little chance of
being able to act independently. First, the executive will attempt to capture the court
by selecting judges believed to be sympathetic to the executive’s policies, in order
to insulate itself from constitutional accountability. Second, the judges on the court,
knowing that they owe their position solely to the executive, will likely be unwilling
to issue a ruling that the executive would oppose.83
Nevertheless, the constitutional courts of both Jordan and Bahrain operate under an executive
model.84 85
b. Multi-Constituency Model: Tunisia and Morocco
A multi-constituency model is a design that makes court appointments a participatory
process between multiple political actors.86 These actors can be government actors or civil society
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actors, and the power that each actor has over appointments may be direct or indirect. 87 Both
Tunisia and Morocco exhibit some form of the multi-constituency model in their respective court
appointment processes.
Tunisia’s constitution divides power over constitutional court appointments evenly
between three branches: the Assembly of the Representatives, the Supreme Judicial Council, and
the President each control four appointments.88 Legislation also dictates that Assembly
appointments must be filled first.89 A successful appointment requires at least 145 favorable votes
out of 217 members in Parliament (qualifying as a supermajority). This requirement has proven
difficult to meet since, as of January 2021, only one member of the Constitutional Court has
successfully been appointed.90
Morocco splits its appointments between the executive and the legislative dimensions of
government. Article 130 dictates that the Constitutional Court be composed of twelve members:
six appointed by the King, and six appointed by the legislature. In the two-chamber legislature,
three members of the Court are to be appointed by the Chamber of Representatives, and three
appointed by the Chamber of Councilors.91
c. Judicial Council Model: Kuwait
The judicial council model can probably be described as taking the opposite approach of
the multi-constituency model. The multi-constituency model attempts to promote separation of
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powers through insulating the appointment process from political manipulation by inviting
multiple political actors to participate. In contrast, the judicial council model attempts to promote
separation of power by removing the process from any direct political participation. Appointment
powers rest with a judicial council, which may consist of members of multiple political branches,
and even non-political groups such as bar associations and legal institutions.92 As a result, the
judicial council model may give opportunity “to involve a wide spectrum of society in the judicial
appointment process.”93
Kuwait is the only country studied that follows the judicial council model, and its court
appointment process is very involved. The Kuwaiti process will therefore be discussed in greater
detail.
According to Article 2 of Law No. 14 Establishing the Constitutional Court (Law 14/1973),
Kuwait’s Constitutional Court is composed of five members chosen by the Supreme Judicial
Council by secret ballot, then appointed by decree. The Supreme Judicial Council itself is
composed of seven members: five senior officials from other judicial bodies, the Attorney General,
and the Vice-Minister of Justice.94 In determining whether insulation from political actors has
actually been achieved in Kuwait’s judicial council model, the appointment process of the five
judicial officials comprising the Supreme Judicial Council becomes relevant.
The five senior judicial officials on the Supreme Judicial Council are: the President and
Vice-President of the Court of Cassation; the President and Vice-President of the Appeals Court;
and the President of the Supreme Court (or “Court of First Instance”).95 These officials are
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appointed by royal decree based on the proposal of the Minister of Justice “after taking the opinion
of the Supreme Judicial Council.”96 Similarly, the Attorney General is appointed by decree based
on the proposal of the Minister of Justice “after consulting the Supreme Judicial Council.”97 Both
the Minister and Vice-Minister of Justice serve in the executive cabinet. Therefore, the executive
ultimately controls appointment to the Judicial Council, which in turn appoints the members of the
Constitutional Court. Instead of insulating the constitutional court appointment process from
political actors, the Kuwaiti model appears to simply move political participation (specifically,
executive control) up one further level of abstraction.98
D. Review of Electoral Laws and Elections
“Constitutional courts are often called upon to determine the constitutionality of electoral
laws, to play a role in the oversight of elections and to certify electoral results.”99 This can be
particularly important in countries experiencing transition from authoritarian regimes, where free
elections are foreign or where elections have historically been manipulated.
1. Jurisdiction and Review of Electoral Laws and Elections: Morocco, Kuwait
Out of the five countries studied, only Morocco and Kuwait have constitutional courts with
jurisdiction that applies to this function. The language of Morocco’s Constitution states that the
Court decides “on the regularity of the election of the members of Parliament and of the operations
of referendum.”100 Morocco’s Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of parliamentary
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elections and referenda.101 Similarly, Kuwait’s Constitutional Court has the power to hear appeals
related to the election of members of the National Assembly.102
E. Political Party Regulation
For similar reasons to the function of reviewing elections, constitutional courts may be
called upon to guide the formation and regulation of political parties. In the wake of transition,
some political parties may be institutionally advantaged (or disadvantaged) because of a close (or
broken) relationship with the former authoritarian regime. The former regime therefore may retain
much power in the new government, or may be intentionally excluded, by a court’s regulation of
political parties.103 Constitutional courts have opportunity to make neutral decisions regarding
political parties, including decisions on eligibility and membership.
1. Jurisdiction and Political Party Regulation: Morocco, Kuwait
Again, only Morocco and Kuwait have constitutional courts with jurisdiction regarding
this function. Morocco’s Court has jurisdiction over the termination of political party membership
of a national legislator.104 Kuwait’s Constitutional Court has the power to hear appeals related to
the election of members of the National Assembly or the validity of their membership.105
F. Oversight of Constitutional Amendment Procedures: Tunisia, Morocco
Constitutional courts can serve as “guardians” of the constitution itself by overseeing the
process by which the constitution is amended, to ensure that the proposed changes are consistent
with the spirit of the document.106 This is particularly important if the constitution identifies certain
provisions as inviolable, or as more fundamental or essential.
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1. Jurisdiction and Oversight of Constitutional Amendment Procedures: Tunisia,
Morocco
Tunisia’s Court has jurisdiction over the constitutionality of constitutional amendments107
and constitutional amendment procedures.108 Every constitutional amendment and amendment
procedure must be determined constitutional by Tunisia’s Constitutional Court before it can
proceed.109 Morocco’s Court is required to oversee constitutional amendment procedures: “The
Constitutional Court controls the regularity of the [constitutional amendment procedure] and
proclaims the results.”110 If more constitutional courts wield jurisdiction relevant to this function,
it is expressed in more ambiguous terms.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The pre-existing Court of Bahrain underwent relatively few design changes after the Arab
Spring. There is a smaller number of constitutional matters upon which it is empowered to decide,
and there are generally more hurdles that must be jumped for those matters to come before the
Court. Its appointment process is entirely dominated by the executive. Interestingly, the new
Constitutional Court of Jordan born out of the Arab Spring most closely resembles the Bahraini
Court: its jurisdiction is small (or simply ambiguous), its access points are controlled by other
political actors (including the Court of Cassation), and its appointment process is entirely
dominated by the executive.
The Courts of Tunisia and Morocco, also born out of the Arab Spring, have both been
designed with broad jurisdictions and participatory court appointment models. They are the only
two Courts with the power of oversight over constitutional amendment procedures. Morocco’s
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Court also has the nearly unique characteristic of having regulatory power over elections and
electoral laws as well as political parties. However, Morocco’s Court is also dependent on the
Court of Cassation for its ability to hear cases in controversy, and the highly participatory nature
of Tunisia’s court appointment model has had the effect of preventing appointment of judges to
the Constitutional Court.
Kuwait’s Constitutional Court has defied easy categorization. This older Court is the only
constitutional court studied here with a judicial council model of appointment (even though the
Kuwaiti Judicial Council is itself controlled by the executive). The Kuwaiti Court’s composition
and powers are largely determined by enacting legislation, and the enacting legislation has created
a system that theoretically makes the Court highly accessible to the public. Kuwait’s Court also
joins the Court of Morocco as the only other constitutional court studied with regulatory or
supervisory power over elections, electoral law, and political parties.
The older constitutional courts of Bahrain and Kuwait have longstanding history and
affiliations with authoritarian regimes that make commentators doubtful of their ability or
willingness to serve as a democratizing force in the post-Arab Spring MENA region. The newer
constitutional courts of Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan have been variously equipped for the task
of contributing to constitutional democracy, but to varying degrees face challenges of jurisdiction,
access, and actual appointment.
In summary, the Arab Spring thoroughly challenged some authoritarian regimes and
sparked new constitutional experiments in a few countries. In some ways, the constitutional
experiments have been radical: entirely new constitutional courts emerged in Tunisia, Jordan, and
Morocco (along with entirely new constitutions in Tunisia and Morocco). In others, the
experiments have not pulled countries far from the status quo: Tunisia’s Court is not functional,
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Morocco’s is often restricted by other political actors, and Jordan’s follows the executivedominated design of Bahrain while at the same time being restricted by its own Court of Cassation.
Surprisingly little has been reported or can be witnessed about the practical success of these
constitutional experiments in turning countries away from authoritarianism, and the history of
constitutional courts in the MENA region is still being written. Still, the landscape of constitutional
courts in the region, so far as it has been illuminated by this case study, is a fascinating picture:
courts the products of years of authoritarian partnership weathering sweeping constitutional
change like a storm that will soon pass, while other new courts find themselves planted in
inhospitable ground. The apparent success or failure of these courts’ designs perhaps can be
understood as a litmus test for the extent of liberal constitutional change the MENA region’s
political climate will allow. Still, there is much more landscape here to survey, much more to
understand, and much more to watch unfold.
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